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Abstract 
This chapter integrates from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and social 
psychology the basic science of bias in human judgment as relevant to judgments and decisions 
by forensic mental health professionals.  Forensic mental health professionals help courts make 
decisions in cases when some question of psychology is relevant to the legal issue, such as in 
insanity cases, child custody hearings, and psychological injuries in civil suits.  The legal system 
itself and many people involved, such as jurors, assume mental health experts are “objective” 
and untainted by bias.  However, basic psychological science from several branches of the 
discipline suggest the law’s assumption about experts’ protection from bias is wrong.  Indeed, 
several empirical studies now show clear evidence of (unintentional) bias in forensic mental 
experts’ judgments and decisions. In this chapter, we explain the science of how and why human 
judgments are susceptible to various kinds of bias.  We describe dual-process theories from 
cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and social psychology that can help explain 
biased judgments. We review the empirical evidence to date specifically about cognitive and 
social psychological biases in forensic mental health judgments, weaving in related literature 
about biases in other types of expert judgment with hypotheses about how forensic experts are 
likely affected by these biases. We close with a discussion of directions for future research and 
practice. 
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The Cognitive and Social Psychological Bases of Bias in Forensic Mental Health Judgments 
This chapter reviews the basic psychological science of bias in human judgment as 
relevant to judgments and decisions by forensic mental health professionals. The legal system 
itself and many people involved, such as jurors, assume mental health experts can be and 
typically are “objective” and protected by bias.  Many experts themselves believe they can 
control their various biases in order to practice objectively. Indeed, psychology ethics codes and 
guidelines require that practicing psychologists be objective. However, basic psychological 
science from several branches of the discipline suggest these assumptions about experts’ 
protection from bias is wrong.  Empirical studies now show clear evidence of (unintentional) 
bias in forensic mental experts’ judgments and decisions. This chapter explains how and why 
human judgments are susceptible to various kinds of bias, with specific emphasis on expert 
judgments, particularly but not exclusively in the domain of forensic psychology.  The 
implications across these findings for bias mitigation are discussed, as are promising directions 
for bias mitigation. We close with a discussion of directions for future research and practice. 
The Psychology of Bias in Cognitive and Social Judgments 
Much of this chapter will focus on cognitive psychological issues of mental functioning, 
such as perception, reasoning, attention, memory, and decision making with coverage of core 
cognitive psychological literature.  However, this chapter will also focus on social psychological 
issues (particularly, social cognition) involving how other people affect our perceptions, 
reasoning, attention, memory, and decision making.  Some areas in which social cognition can 
inform the topics discussed in this chapter include attitudes, stereotypes, impression formation, 
the self, person perception, attribution, persuasion, and conformity (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; 
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Devine, Hamilton, & Ostrom, 1994; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). The dual-process theoretical 
foundation of this chapter is inherent in both the cognitive and social-cognitive literatures. 
Human cognitive processing abilities are in many ways extraordinary.  Our cognitive 
processing machinery has evolved into an “adaptive toolbox” to help us efficiently process the 
vast amounts of information we’re faced with each day (e.g., Hoffrage & Gigerenzer, 2004).  We 
literally wouldn’t be able to function if we didn’t have “shortcuts” that work well most of the 
time to help us reduce the complexities of our environment, cope with information overload, and 
make reasonable judgments and decisions.  Haselton, Bryant, Wilke, Frederick, & Galperin 
(2009) and Gigerenzer (2008) describe how our adaptively rational mind developed based on our 
ancestors’ need for survival, and how the influence of mechanisms from the past influence our 
actions today.  
But this very design also makes us susceptible to making predictable and systematic 
errors (see e.g., Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Klein, 2009).  For example, our prior 
expectations distort our subsequent processing of new information. Our personal self-interest 
shapes our interpretation of “objective” data and facts. Other people affect our judgments in 
ways we are unaware. Even random numbers in our environment can act as “anchors” that pull 
our numeric estimates away from the truth and toward something irrelevant. These biases, one 
might hope and expect, should be less likely to impact experts—particularly experts making 
judgments and decisions in their domain of expertise – like forensic psychologists in forensic 
psychological evaluations. Yet, the evidence suggests that experts are indeed human – and that 
their brains work like the rest of ours, for better and for worse.  The types of biases we focus on 
in this chapter are unintentional, “System 1” biases that are below the level of conscious 
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awareness, as we explain next.  Although experts can be biased by other types of more 
intentional and explicit biases, this chapter focuses on unintentional biases. 
Dual-Process Theories 
Evidence from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and social-cognition is 
converging on the conclusion that human brain functioning can be characterized by two types of 
cognition, each with different functions and strengths and weaknesses (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; 
Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000; Kahneman, 2003).  System 
1 (sometimes referred to as Type 1) processing occurs automatically, quickly, with little or no 
effort, and implicitly – that is, below the level of conscious awareness.  In contrast, System 2 
(Type 2) processing is slow, deliberate, effortful, and explicitly conscious.  These distinctions are 
important, because in this chapter we focus on System 1 biases that occur quickly, automatically, 
and outside of the awareness of experts. Experts are human, and thus it is reasonable and even 
expected that they should experience the kinds of cognitive strengths and limitations that other 
humans face.  Understanding these factors can inform how to better structure the decision tasks 
experts face in order to minimize the chances that System 1 errors and biases can affect experts’ 
judgments. 
 While the preceding research has revealed the qualities of dual-processes of cognition 
within a dual-system framework, some researchers have argued against this notion.  Evans’ 
(2008) review of dual-system models led him to suggest that dual-systems do not necessarily 
follow from dual-processes, calling this conclusion “oversimplified and misleading” (p. 270). He 
argues the data show the processes are not mutually exclusive, either structurally or functionally, 
and that they each share conscious and preconscious operations. Instead, he proposes that 
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reflective cognition requires access to a central working-memory repository, in which overload 
or interference can then disrupt its processes – an interactive approach to cognition. 
Cognitive Psychology: The Heuristics and Biases Literature 
 Some researchers have argued that System 1-induced cognitive “biases” are not really 
biases (Gigerenzer, 1991), but rather illustrate an adaptive rationality (Gigerenzer, 2008; 
Haselton et al., 2009) that aids an organism’s survival by rapidly evaluating environmental data 
and guiding appropriate behavior. However, these swift processes are nonetheless prone to error 
in systematic ways.  Thus, “bias,” as used in the heuristics and biases tradition of cognitive 
psychology, is a by-product of System 1 mental shortcuts. The framing of System 1 processes as 
problematic “biases” versus “adaptive strengths” is a longstanding point of contention in the 
literature (see e.g., Kahneman & Klein, 2009), which is relevant for thinking about experts’ 
decisions processes.  Although there is disagreement about the types of heuristics and how they 
are observed, there seems to be a general consensus regarding heuristics as highly serviceable 
aspects of cognition, though subject to error.  
System 1 “heuristics,” or mental shortcuts that expedite the time and effort required to 
process and interpret information, involve a speed/accuracy tradeoff allows an individual to 
make judgments and decisions that are “good enough” even though a more maximal outcome 
may exist. Notable heuristics initially developed by decision researchers include 
representativeness (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972), availability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), 
and anchoring (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), with the later addition of affect (Slovic, Finucane, 
Peters, & MacGregor, 2007). Representativeness is a way of organizing information based upon 
its similarity to other information, whereas availability affects judgments based on how easy or it 
is to recall other examples of an event in question. Anchoring affects judgments in that initial 
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information encountered is more heavily weighted than subsequent information. Affect is an 
emotion-oriented heuristic, in which people pursue pleasure and avoid pain. While these methods 
are generally sufficient in cuing appropriate behavior, they can distort the likelihood or 
magnitude of an event’s occurrence, leading to systematic biases in judgments and choices.  
Gigerenzer (1991, 1996) has argued against these specific heuristics, calling them merely 
labels of behavior, and devoid of ecological applicability. Alternatively, he has put forth 
common misconceptions of heuristics and proposed an “adaptive toolbox” (Gigerenzer, 2008) of 
behavioral processes, including satisficing, recognition, and default. Satisficing is choosing the 
first option that meets an acceptable level of criteria; the recognition heuristic places a greater 
value on options that are recognizable; and the default heuristic strives to maintain the status quo, 
unless another option is far superior. Moreover, he claims these adaptive heuristics can 
outperform objective, mathematical analyses of decision scenarios (e.g., System 2 processes) and 
calls for research to focus more heavily on the interaction between these strategies and the 
environments in which they are made. Haselton and colleagues’ (2009) research seems to 
substantiate Gigerenzer’s proposals, suggesting heuristics are not as flawed as previous research 
posits and that limited environmental information may lead to erroneous conclusions.  
It should be noted that Kahneman and Tversky acknowledged the efficacy of heuristics in 
daily judgments and decisions, but were more interested in examining how resulting behavior 
deviated from theories postulating the optimality of statistical intuition (which Gigerenzer also 
acknowledges can readily happen). And if such aberrations were not merely trace artifacts, but 
systematic, reproducible, and predictable violations, then it should be possible to implement 
corrective measures. 
 
 
BIASES IN FORENSIC JUDGMENTS  9 
 
 
In many ways, experts develop ways of recognizing and diagnosing situations that non-
experts cannot – by virtue of both System 1 and System 2 processes.  But System 1 can 
sometimes lead experts astray, even in their own domains of expertise.  The reason it’s important 
to recognize how and when this can happen – to identify some common problems – is that we 
can then develop methodologies to ameliorate their negative influences. 
Cognitive Psychological Biases and Forensic Mental Health Judgments 
This section considers various cognitive biases that may affect forensic mental health 
judgments. We also discuss the role of bias in judgments and decision making in similar expert 
judgment situation outside of the forensic mental health field in order to expand this discussion.  
Should the reader be interested in some thought experiments and examples of how the heuristics 
mentioned above might affect forensic mental health judgments, see Neal and Grisso (2014).   
For example, Neal and Grisso (2014) provide a vignette about “John P.” and his potential 
mental illness at the time of an alleged crime to illustrate the representativeness heuristic as 
relevant to forensic mental health, as well as a related real-world example of an internationally 
recognized forensic psychiatrist neglecting relevant base-rates in the John Hinckley trial (1982 
trial of the attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan).  To illustrate the availability 
heuristic, Neal and Grisso discuss the problem of false negatives in sex offender risk 
assessments, invite readers to attempt an adapted version of the Wason (1968) card task, and 
describe the relevance of Kahneman’s (2011) WYSIATI (What You See Is All There Is) concept 
for forensic mental health assessments.  WYSIATI is closely related to the availability heuristic: 
only ideas that are activated in a person’s mind are processed within a given decision task.  
Finally, to illustrate anchoring, Neal and Grisso describe a case in which one might encounter 
one likeable parent versus the other in a child custody evaluation and they further describe 
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framing and context effects as relevant to forensic decision tasks, to be discussed in more depth 
in the following section.   
Evidence to date specifically relevant to forensic mental health judgments.  Even for 
experts who are motivated to be unbiased, there is mounting evidence that forensic mental health 
experts are susceptible to System 1-induced biases by virtue of being human.  For example, clear 
evidence of the “self-serving bias,” which has been labeled “adversarial allegiance” in the 
forensic mental health field has been documented.  Adversarial allegiance is an unintentional 
tendency for experts to find evidence in support of their retaining party’s position – an 
anchoring-like effect – and has been uncovered in forensic mental health judgments (Murrie, 
Boccaccini, Guarnera, & Rufino, 2013).  Confirmation bias, or a tendency for experts to seek 
evidence in support of an initial hypothesis without seeking disconfirming evidence – another 
type of System 1 bias – has also been documented in forensic mental health experts’ judgments 
(Neal, MacLean, Morgan, & Murrie, 2017)  And hindsight bias, another System 1 bias, has been 
found in forensic psychiatrists’ judgments (LeBourgeois, Pinals, Williams, & Appelbaum, 2007).  
Self-Serving Bias. Affiliations with other people affect people’s processing of 
information.  One of the first studies of the power of affiliation documenting the self-serving bias 
was actually with regard to sports teams.  In a classic study, Hastdorf and Cantril (1954) showed 
that football fans from each team blamed the other team for behaving badly while discounting 
their own team’s behaviors.  In a more legally-relevant study, Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) 
showed that even when provided with the same case information, people on opposing sides of a 
case reach different conclusions based on that evidence – in favor of their own interests. In this 
study, Babcock and Loewenstein provided pairs of participants with police and medical reports, 
depositions, and other materials from a lawsuit resulting from a collision between a motorcycle 
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and a car.  Participants were randomly assigned to the role of either the motorcyclist plaintiff or 
car-driving defendant. Participants in the motorcyclist plaintiff role found evidence to support 
their positon and predicted dramatically larger damage awards than the defendants. 
In the American adversarial legal system, forensic mental health experts are often 
retained by one side or another in a case.  Involvement and affiliation with attorneys has been 
shown to influence experts’ examination and evaluation of case materials in that experts end up 
emphasizing findings and patterns that support “their side.” Murrie, Boccaccini and colleagues 
documented this phenomenon in observational studies where they found clear patterns of experts 
scoring standardized psychological tools in favor of their retaining party in sexual offender civil 
commitment cases (Murrie, Boccaccini, Johnson, & Janke, 2008; Murrie, Boccaccini, Turner, 
Meeks, Woods, & Tussey, 2009).  For example, Murrie et al. (2009)  looked at real sexual 
offender civil commitment cases and measured the extent to which experts on each “side” of the 
case scored three tools that are often used in sex offender risk assessments: the Minnesota Sex 
Offender Screening Tool-Revised (MnSOST-R; Epperson et al., 1998), Psychopathy Checklist-
Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 2003), and the STATIC-99 (Hanson & Thornton, 1999). 
Consistent with the self-serving bias / adversarial allegiance hypothesis, Murrie et al. 
(2009) showed that plaintiff-retained experts scored the offenders on average 3.53 points higher 
than respondent-retained experts on the MnSOST-R (Cohen’s d = 0.85, a large effect size), 5.79 
points higher on the PCL-R (Cohen’s d = 0.78, a large effect size), and 0.52 points higher on the 
STATIC-99 (Cohen’s d = 0.34, a moderately small effect size on a measure with less subjective 
items).  Furthermore, they calculated the proportion of variance in the scores on these tools that 
were attributable to the offender (which ideally would be 100%), the side of the case (ideally 
0%), and other error (ideally 0%).  They found that 44% of the variance on the MnSOST-R was 
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attributable to the offender, 26% was attributable to the side of the case (this is the adversarial 
allegiance effect), and 30% was other error.  On the PCL-R, 42% of the variance was attributable 
to the offender, 23% to the side of the case (adversarial allegiance), and 35% to other error.  And 
for the most structured and least subjective measure, the STATIC-99, 62% of the variance was 
attributable to the offender, only 4% to the side of the case (adversarial allegiance), and 34% to 
other error.  
The systematic evidence of adversarial allegiance in forensic mental health evaluations 
led researchers to probe more deeply into potential explanations for the findings.  Were forensic 
mental health evaluators intentionally biased “hired guns?”  Or were they unintentionally biased 
and unaware of it – biased by unconscious System 1 processes by virtue of being human? Was it 
the mere fact of the adversarial hire itself that caused the adversarial allegiance bias, or was it 
something else (e.g., self-selection factors, like experts choosing which side to work for based on 
pre-existing biases)?  Murrie et al. (2013) designed an elegant experiment to explore some of 
these questions. 
In an experimental study of civil commitment proceedings for sex offenders, Murrie et 
al., (2013) had real forensic mental health experts hired by a referring attorney via a script 
(randomly assigned to either plaintiff or respondent).  That is, the manipulated independent 
variable was the adversarial “side” for which experts thought they were working (the case and 
offender materials were held constant).  The participant-experts were asked to score four 
offenders on two commonly-used and well-researched risk instruments, the PCL-R and the 
STATIC-99.  Importantly, the forensic evaluators were paid $400 for their consultation and were 
deceived to believe these referrals were real, as opposed to being part of a research study: they 
did not know they were being studied. 
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Results revealed a significant bias as a function of the side by which the expert was 
retained: more evidence of adversarial allegiance. Forensic mental health experts who believed 
they were working for the plaintiff assigned higher scores on the risk instruments than experts 
who believed they were working for the respondent.  The effect sizes were up to d = 0.85 (large 
effects) for the PCL-R and up to d = 0.42 on the STATIC-99 (moderately small effect on this 
measure with less subjective items). Of course there is considerable variability in scoring 
assessment instruments: not every evaluator will produce consistent scores.  But here, a large 
portion of the systematic score differences amongst opposing experts was explained by 
adversarial allegiance and not by chance or random error.  
The study demonstrated that experts scoring ostensibly objective assessment instruments 
assigned scores that were systematically biased towards the side that retained them. Given the 
experimental design of the study, cause can be inferred: the only variable that differed between 
the two conditions was the hiring party.  Participants were unaware that the hiring party 
influenced their scores, yet there was clear evidence that adversarial allegiance absolutely 
influenced experts’ scores. Thus, Murrie and colleagues (2013) attributed the adversarial 
allegiance effect directly to experts’ beliefs about for whom they were working, because they 
controlled for other possible explanations.   
The substantive information provided about the offender was constant, so differences in 
the way the examinee presented could not have explained the findings.  Furthermore, they 
eliminated the overt verbal influence often provided by the referral party in routine forensic 
practice that contributes to confirmation bias by using a script.  This design element is important: 
their findings show that even when there is no overt framing by a referral party, there is still an 
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insidious, unconscious, and potent form of anchoring due to adversarial allegiance affecting 
forensic mental health professionals’ judgments and decisions.  
         McAuliff & Arter (2016) studied the potential influence of adversarial allegiance on 
different aspects of expert testimony in simulated child sexual abuse case. Participant experts 
were asked by either the prosecution or the defense to read a description of a police officer’s low 
or high suggestive interview with a 5-year-old girl. Experts were more willing to testify if asked 
by the prosecution when the suggestibility in the police officer interview was low, meaning when 
the interview was done soundly by the officer and did not raise concerns about the child’s 
accuracy. Whereas the experts that were asked by the defense were more willing to testify when 
the suggestibility of the interview was high, meaning the interview between the police officer 
was unsound and concerns about the child’s accuracy were raised. Thus, experts may have 
perceived their testimony as being more relevant and more helpful to jurors when the evidence 
favored the party soliciting their testimony – more evidence suggestive of adversarial allegiance 
and how the adversarial system influences forensic mental health professionals’ judgments and 
decisions. 
 Confirmation bias. Neal et al. (2017) conducted a recent study of confirmation bias in 
forensic psychologists’ diagnostic reasoning.  Confirmation bias is a System-1 type of process in 
which people tend to seek and rely on information that confirms a “hunch” rather than seeking 
disconfirmatory information (see Nickerson, 1998). The modern scientific method evolved in 
part to combat the powerful “confirmatory” bias in hypothesis-testing (Popper, 1959; Neal & 
Saks, in preparation), yet evidence of confirmation bias persists in many contexts. Some 
examples include intelligence analysis (Cook & Smallman, 2008), criminal investigations (Ask 
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& Granhag, 2005), radiology diagnostic tasks (Drew, Vo, & Wolfe, 2013), and even in science 
itself (MacCoun, 1998).  
 A national sample of 118 randomly-selected experienced forensic psychologists were 
invited via an email invitation to participate in the study (17% response rate).  Participants were 
asked to provide diagnostic hypotheses for and answer questions about one of four randomly-
assigned vignettes of people presenting with different sets of symptoms and from different 
referral contexts. The initial diagnostic question asked participants to rank-order a list of four 
possible initial diagnostic hypotheses “in order of likelihood that this person may meet DSM-5 
diagnostic criteria for each” (the options were the same across vignettes). From there, they 
received a piped follow-up question linked to the diagnostic hypothesis they rank-ordered first. 
The follow-up question asked “Now, based on your primary diagnostic hypothesis that 
Mr. G meets criteria for x, what piece of information would you want first in order to effectively 
test your primary diagnostic hypothesis?” They were provided with a choice between two types 
of information: one that might confirm their initial hypothesis, and one that might disconfirm 
their initial hypothesis. For example, for participants who rank-ordered Intellectual Disability as 
their first diagnostic hypothesis, they had the choice between “Did Mr. G show deficits in 
intellectual functioning on the standardized intelligence tests he took at ages 10 and 14?” 
(confirmatory) and “Does Mr. G have a personality disorder that could explain his symptoms?” 
(disconfirmatory).  We hypothesized clinicians would be more likely to choose the confirmatory 
than disconfirmatory information (i.e., engage in confirmation bias). 
The survey also included the three-item (M=1.41, SD=1.17) Cognitive Reflection Task 
(Frederick 2005), which had good reliability in this sample, alpha=0.72. Cognitive reflection is 
the ability to reflect on a question and resist the first “heuristic” response that comes to mind, 
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instead engaging in deliberative thought to reach an answer. We predicted clinicians with higher 
cognitive reflection tendencies would be less likely to engage in confirmatory bias.  
Results indicated that forensic clinicians overwhelmingly engaged in confirmation bias: 
103 of the 111 people who responded to this question chose the confirmatory information, χ2 (1) 
= 81.31, p < 0.001. Cognitive reflection had a statistically and theoretically significant 
association with confirmation bias in the predicted direction. Each unit higher on the three-item 
cognitive reflection task (representing higher cognitive reflection tendencies) halved the odds of 
confirmatory bias, B = -0.75, Wald(1) = 3.85, p = 0.050, Exp(B) = 0.473 (logistic regression 
model χ2 [1] = 4.67, p = 0.031).   
These findings demonstrate robust confirmation bias in diagnostic reasoning in a 
representative sample of licensed psychologists in forensic practice in the US.  Susceptibility to 
this bias was related to lower cognitive reflection tendencies (i.e., tendency to rely more on 
System 1 than System 2 thinking). What this study does not tell us is how far confirmation bias 
persists (how far beyond the “first piece of information”).  Neal and colleagues are currently 
collecting new data to explore this question.  
Hindsight bias.  Hindsight bias is a System 1 type of bias in which people who know the 
outcome of an event or situation overestimate what they could have known in foresight 
(Fischhoff, 1975). People who know an outcome can’t unknow it – it’s like unhearing a bell that 
was rung – and such knowledge influences people’s beliefs about how predictable or foreseeable 
the outcome actually was.  This bias is highly relevant for legal cases, because legal decision 
makers must reason ex post facto and they know the outcome of the situation (i.e., the crime in 
criminal cases or the tort in civil cases).  This outcome knowledge has been shown to bias 
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decision makers, including jurors (e.g., Labine & Labine, 1996) and judges (e.g., Guthrie, 
Rachlinksi, & Wistrich, 2001).   
In clinical contexts, previous research has shown that physicians are susceptible to 
hindsight bias as well (Arkes, Wortmann, Saville, & Harkness, 1981; Caplan, Posner, & Cheney, 
1991; Sacchi & Cherubini, 2004).  For example, in a study by Caplan et al. (1991), experienced 
anesthesiologists were provided with a set of clinical case scenarios with set facts and were 
asked to review a previous physician’s decisions in the case and rate the standard of care.  
Importantly, they were randomly assigned to know different outcomes of the cases (i.e., 
temporary vs. permanent injury).  Anesthesiologists who knew the outcome was a permanent 
injury were more likely to rate the previous physician’s care as substandard as compared to 
knowledge that the injury was just temporary.  This finding is significant because the cases 
themselves were identical, and the outcome of the situation could not have been known at the 
time of the event itself.  Thus, the retrospective judgments of the appropriateness of care 
delivered by others physicians were but should not have been influenced by the outcome of the 
situation.  
Extending this work into the domain of forensic mental health judgments, LeBourgeois 
and colleagues (2007) exposed psychiatrists to hypothetical cases in which patients with suicidal 
or homicidal thoughts presented for care.  Psychiatrist participants were randomly assigned to 
different outcome knowledge conditions: either that a suicide/homicide occurred shortly after the 
patients were released from care (hindsight group) or no information about outcome (control 
group).  Psychiatrist participants were asked to estimate the likelihood that suicide or homicide 
would occur upon the patient’s release.  Results revealed that forensic psychiatrists were indeed 
affected by hindsight bias: psychiatrists who knew the outcome of the case rated the patient as at 
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a significantly higher risk of suicide/homicide than those in the control condition who did not 
know the outcome of the case. LeBourgeois et al. did not ask participants to what degree 
knowledge of the outcome influenced their judgments.  However, given the nature of the 
hindsight bias and findings from other hindsight bias studies, it is likely the psychiatrists would 
not have been aware of how much knowledge of the outcome actually affected their judgments, 
would have estimated what they would have known without the outcome knowledge, and would 
have overestimated what others actually did know without the outcome knowledge, consistent 
with a System 1-induced bias (Fischhoff, 1975). 
In a recent study of hindsight bias with forensic psychologists as participants, Beltrani, 
Reed, Zapf, Dror, and Otto (2017) used a method similar to LeBourgeois  et al. (2007) and found 
evidence of hindsight bias in forensic psychologists’ decision processes as well.  Participants 
provided with outcome information regarding risk assessment evaluations were more likely to 
indicate that they would have predicted the outcome than evaluators who were not provided with 
outcome information, χ2 (1) = 4.215, p = 0.04, φ = 0.235.  Furthermore, when asked to provide 
reasons for their decisions regarding risk, participants in the known-outcome condition provided 
more risk factors from the initial case information to support their decisions compared to 
participants in the control condition, who selected more protective factors to support their 
decisions.  These results are consistent with motivated reasoning, a social-cognitive theory 
proposing that motivation can affect reasoning through biased cognitive processes regarding how 
information is accessed, constructed, and evaluated (Kunda, 1990). This theory holds that people 
use the tools of cognition to arrive at desired conclusions, constrained only by one’s ability to 
construct reasonable justifications for that conclusion (Kunda). 
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 Related literature on cognitive biases in similar types of judgment tasks.  The 
existence of cognitive biases in similar types of judgment tasks but outside of forensic mental 
health are worth covering briefly.  This is because these biases are likely relevant in forensic 
mental health too, and thus we might generate hypotheses from these studies about how these 
biases might affect the work of forensic mental health professionals.  For example, the judgments 
and decisions of forensic scientists have been shown to be subject to the effects of various 
cognitive biases (e.g., Dror, Charlton, & Péron, 2006; Nakhaeizadeh, Dror, & Morgan, 2014), as 
have judges (Guthrie et al, 2001; Wistrich, Guthrie, & Rachlinski, 2005) elite arbiters (Helm, 
Wistrich, & Rachlinski, 2016), and professional accountants (e.g., Moore, Loewenstein, Tanlu, 
& Bazerman, 2003).  
 Several studies in the forensic science context have revealed the power of “context 
effects” or extraneous information to a case that biases expert’s judgments. For instance, Dror et 
al. (2006) studied whether latent print identification experts were vulnerable to context effects.  
In an inventive method, they asked experts to make a fingerprint match determination on a set of 
fingerprints they had previous examined and made a positive-match decision.  The experts were 
not aware that they were looking at prints they had previously positively identified as a match.  
Crucially, the experimenters provided contextual information suggesting the prints were a no-
match.  In the new context, with the biasing contextual information, most of the fingerprint 
experts made a no-match decision, thus contradicting their own previous match identification 
decisions.   
 Nakhaeizadeh et al. (2014) explored whether forensic anthropology experts would be 
vulnerable to context effects in the assessment of unidentified skeletal remains.  Sure enough, 
experts exposed to contextual information about the sex, ancestry, and age at death of the 
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skeletal remains were affected by that information in their interpretation and conclusion of the 
remains.  Compared to experts in a control condition who received no contextual information 
about the skeletal remains, experts in the contextually biasing information conditions confirmed 
the extraneous contextual information in their biological profile determinations. For example, 
only 31% of participants in the control group concluded that the skeletal remains were male. 
However, among experts in the contextually biasing condition with extraneous information 
suggesting the remains were male, 72% concluded the remains were male, and among those in 
the contextually biasing condition with extraneous information suggesting the remains were 
female, 0% concluded the remains were male. Contextual biases like those described in these 
studies of forensic scientists are likely present in the work of forensic mental health too.   
Judges are experienced, well-trained, and typically highly motivated to be accurate and 
fair.  Nevertheless, clear empirical evidence has been established showing the existence of 
unintentional cognitive biases affecting the judgments and decisions of judges.  For example, 
Guthrie et al. (2001) found in a sample of 167 federal magistrate judges that they were 
susceptible to anchoring effects, framing effects, hindsight bias, the representativeness heuristic, 
and egocentric biases on their judicial decision making.  Similarly, Wistrich et al. (2005) showed 
that judges generally cannot disregard inadmissible information in their legal decisions – even 
when they were reminded, or they themselves had ruled, that the information was inadmissible.  
For example, inadmissible information about demands disclosed during settlement conferences, 
conversations protected by attorney-client privilege, prior sexual history of alleged rape victims, 
prior criminal convictions of plaintiffs, and information the government had promised not to rely 
on at sentencing influenced judges’ decisions despite their best efforts to ignore the inadmissible 
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information. Like the contextual biases that have been shown to affect forensic scientists, these 
various cognitive biases that affect judges do so despite motivation and effort to be unbiased.   
Similarly, Helm et al. (2016) found that elite arbitrators are human too, and subject to 
unintentional System 1-induced biases on their judgments and decisions.  Arbitration is an 
increasingly common type of alternative dispute resolution that provides an alternative to filing a 
lawsuit and going to court (the traditional method for resolving disputes).  Arbitrators resolve 
thousands of disputes every year, including some high-stakes cases (Helm et al.).  Like judges, 
arbitrators are motivated to be unbiased and fair in their decisions, though judges and arbitrators 
differ in several ways.  Elite arbitrators are highly trained and experienced in specialized areas.  
Helm et al. studied elite arbitrators specializing in resolving commercial disputes to determine 
whether these kinds of experts are susceptible to cognitive biases in their work.  As might be 
expected based on the other studies reviewed in this chapter, Helm et al. found that elite 
arbitrators are subject to the conjunction fallacy, framing effects, confirmation bias, and that their 
excessive reliance on intuition may exacerbate the effects of System 1 biases on their 
professional judgments and decisions.  These System 1 biases are likely to affect forensic mental 
health experts too – and they may also excessively rely on intuition in problematic ways. 
Similar to the training processes and ethics codes in forensic mental health, professional 
accountants are trained that objectivity is paramount to their work (Moore et al., 2003). And like 
in forensic mental health, several sources assume that auditor bias is a matter of deliberate choice 
– that is, auditors are assumed to be able to complete high-quality, objective audits if they so 
choose (Bazerman, Loewenstein, & Moore, 2002). However, as Moore and colleagues show, the 
biases that typically affect professional auditors is pervasive, unconscious, and unintentional.  
Moore et al. showed through three experiments that auditors’ judgments are unintentionally 
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biased in favor of their clients (the “self-serving bias”) and that the bias is not easily corrected 
because auditors are not fully aware of the bias or how it affects their judgments (despite 
incentives to be objective).   
Moore et al. (2003) and Bazerman et al. (2002) make some important points about the 
conditions that bias professional auditors that are worth mentioning because similar conditions 
exist in forensic mental health.  Bazerman et al. assert that three structural aspects of accounting 
create substantial opportunities for bias to influence – two of which in particular highly relevant 
to forensic psychology. The first is ambiguity.  Bias thrives whenever information can be 
interpreted in different ways – greater ambiguity leads to more biased information processing 
and outcomes (Kunda, 1990; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992). Auditors must accumulate and 
synthesize a great deal of information to make judgements about client firms – just as forensic 
psychologists must do to make judgements about case referrals.  And like auditing, forensic 
mental health is “art” in addition to some science.  The imprecision inherent in auditing and 
forensic mental health allow motivated reasoning to bias experts judgments.  The second 
condition is attachment, which as we have already described breeds the self-interest bias in 
accountants (Bazerman et al.; Moore et al.) and forensic mental health experts alike (Murrie et 
al., 2013).  
Social Psychology: Explicit and Implicit Social Cognition and Social-Cognitive Biases 
Social psychology is a branch of psychology that focuses on how people affect one 
another’s behaviors, and social cognition is a part of social psychology focused on how other 
people affect a given person’s cognitive functions, such as perceptions, reasoning, attention, 
memory, and decision making (Devine et al., 1994).  Social cognition emerged in the late 1970s 
(Devine et al.), and dual-process theories in social cognition became increasingly common in the 
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1980s and 1990s (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Devine, 1989; Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  
Social behavior and judgments were historically assumed to be under conscious control. 
However, researchers began recognizing that social behavior often is affected by experiences in a 
manner not known by the actor (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).  Dual-process theories began 
emerging in social psychology, theorizing that many social-cognitive judgments and behaviors 
have important implicit (System 1) modes of operation.  These dual-process theories in social 
cognition have attempted to describe implicit, unconscious, heuristic processes (System 1) as 
separate but certainly related to explicit, conscious, and deliberative processes (System 2) in such 
areas as attitudes (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Greenwald & Banaji; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), 
perceptions of the self (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji), stereotypes (e.g., Devine, 1989; Greenwald & 
Banaji), and perception of others (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999), among other areas.  In this 
chapter, we will review the empirical evidence to date on implicit (System 1) processes including 
attitudes, perceptions of oneself, and stereotypes as they affect forensic mental health experts’ 
judgments and decisions as well as experts in fields who face similar judgment tasks. 
Social Psychological Biases and Forensic Mental Health Judgments 
People’s (including experts’) perceptions, judgments, and decisions can be influenced by 
other people, by their expectations about other people’s perceptions, by subtle features of the 
environment, and by their own pre-existing attitudes and beliefs.  Furthermore, people can be 
biased even when motivated not to be, and when people compare their own biases against others, 
they have a much harder time seeing their own biases than they do biases in other people.  This 
section examines these kinds of social psychological biases as they might affect forensic mental 
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health judgments and decisions as well as the judgments and decisions of experts in fields who 
face similar decision tasks.  
 For example, we review evidence about how attitudes toward issues such as capital 
punishment and gender equality unintentionally affect experts’ judgments and decisions, how 
perceptions of oneself as compared to others are unintentionally distorted due to introspective 
failures (because by definition these implicit processes are below one’s level of conscious 
awareness), and how stereotypes about race and ethnicity unintentionally affect experts’ 
judgments and decisions.   
Evidence to date about social-cognitive biases relevant to forensic mental health 
judgments. Implicit (System 1) social psychological processes have been shown to affect the 
judgments and decisions of forensic mental health professionals.  Even for experts who are 
motivated to be unbiased, there is mounting evidence that forensic mental health experts are 
susceptible to System 1-induced social-cognitive biases by virtue of being human.  For example, 
evidence has emerged that forensic psychologists’ capital punishment attitudes affect their 
judgments and decisions in capital cases (Neal, 2016; Neal & Cramer, under review). And an 
insidious social-cognitive bias called the “bias blind spot,” which refers to an exceedingly 
common human tendency to recognize bias in others but fail to recognize it in oneself (Pronin, 
Lin, & Ross, 2002), has been documented in forensic mental health professionals (Commons, 
Miller, & Gutheil, 2004; Neal & Brodsky, 2016; Neal et al., 2017; Zapf, Kukucka, Kassin, & 
Dror, 2017).  Although we sought to review research on how stereotypes affect forensic mental 
health professionals’ judgments, we could locate no research on this issue to date. 
Attitudes. Neal (2016) sought to answer whether forensic mental health experts’ 
preexisting attitudes might affect their professional judgments and decisions.  To investigate this 
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question, Neal focused on death penalty attitudes and decisions relevant to capital cases.  She 
measured the death penalty attitudes of 206 forensic psychologists (using the Death Penalty 
Attitudes Scale, O’Neil, Patry, & Penrod, 2004) and asked the forensic psychologist respondents 
whether they would work for the prosecution, defense, and/or court in capital cases.  She 
hypothesized that evaluator attitudes toward capital punishment would systematically influence 
their willingness to accept capital case referrals, such that evaluators with strong support would 
be more likely to work for the prosecution and evaluators with low support would be more likely 
to work for the defense. These hypotheses were partially supported.   
As hypothesized, lower support was associated with being willing to work for the 
defense, as well as a higher likelihood of rejecting any referral from any source (abstaining 
completely from capital case evaluations).  And stronger support was associated with higher 
willingness to be involved in capital cases across any referral source.  No psychologists reported 
selective willingness to work only for the prosecution (though several did report selective 
willingness to work only for the defense – correlated with the strength of their opposition to the 
death penalty).  Neal asserted these findings raise the specter of systematically biased 
involvement of forensic psychologists in capital case evaluations based on their death penalty 
attitudes. She also suggested these findings provide a partial explanation for the “allegiance 
effect” such that evaluators’ preexisting attitudes may influence their selective participation in 
the legal process via “filtering” effects. Future research is needed to further explore the effect of 
experts’ preexisting attitudes and whether these attitudes transfer to biased decision-making in 
the cases themselves. In this study, attitudes were measured explicitly rather than implicitly – 
future work must measure the effects of implicit attitudes on judgments. 
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Neal and Cramer (in progress) studied forensic psychologists death penalty attitudes 
again, this time studying whether these attitudes were systematically related to forensic 
psychologists’ willingness to conduct the most ethically questionable clinical task in the criminal 
justice system: competence for execution evaluations.  Although there was no direct effect of 
death penalty attitudes on willingness to accept competence for execution referrals, that 
relationship was fully mediated by moral disengagement.  Moral disengagement is a social-
cognitive process through which people reason their way toward harming others (Bandura, 
2015).  Thus, moral disengagement served as a theoretical “bridge” between forensic 
psychologists’ attitudes and judgments, an interesting finding for helping clarify how 
psychologists decide to engage in competence for execution evaluations.  Here again, the 
measures were explicit rather than implicit, and studies of implicit attitudes are needed.  
The Self: Bias Blind Spot.  The bias blind spot has been found across many social 
groups: college students believe they are less biased than their fellow students, airline passengers 
think they are less biased than other passengers, car drivers on average believe themselves to be 
above-average drivers, and so forth. Pronin and colleagues (2002) conducted a series of studies 
looking at multiple biases by having participants self-report various biases, and then indicate 
how much the average American was biased. Participants overwhelmingly reported that they 
personally were less biased than the average American across many different types of biasing 
situations, showing the generalizability of this concept.  
The bias blind spot is theorized to arise from the interplay of two phenomena: the 
introspection illusion and the naive realism. People tend to self-evaluate the extent of bias in 
their own behavior through introspection. Since introspection is unlikely to reveal biased thought 
processes (due to these implicit processes occurring below the level of conscious awareness), 
 
 
BIASES IN FORENSIC JUDGMENTS  27 
 
 
they typically go unnoticed and uncorrected. Naive realism is the conviction that oneself 
interacts with the world objectively and therefore one’s behavior sufficiently reflects a rational 
response to the environment, while others’ respond in ways that are not grounded in reality 
(Pronin, Gilovich & Ross, 2004, Scopelliti et al., 2015). 
Commons et al. (2004) asked forensic psychiatrists to rate their potential bias in a number 
of situations, including recent cases in which they had served as an expert witness.  They 
concluded that forensic psychiatrists markedly underestimate their own biases compared to their 
peers, consistent with the bias blind spot. Moreover, some situations were perceived as more 
biasing than others, and participants underestimated the biasing effects of conflicts of interest for 
both themselves and opposing experts.  
Neal and Brodsky (2016) found evidence suggestive of a bias blind spot in forensic 
psychologists.  Using deep narrative interviews in a qualitative study with board-certified 
forensic psychologists, they found that forensic evaluators perceived themselves as less 
vulnerable to bias compared to their colleagues. Participants had no trouble identifying bias in 
their colleagues (100% of the sample discussed ways in which they had observed bias in their 
colleagues), but many fewer reported any concern about bias in themselves (60% mentioned any 
concern). Some even reported that they take over cases that might be considered a challenge for 
others because they believe they are able to control themselves in a way that their colleagues 
cannot. This finding was theorized to be a result of bias blind spot-induced overconfidence in 
one’s own judgments, a negative consequence that could lead to risky decision making and 
rejecting aid that may reduce bias and improve validity.  
In a recent study of 1,099 forensic mental health professionals across 39 different 
countries, Zapf et al. (2017) again found evidence of the bias blind spot.  In their sample, the 
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mean accuracy rating that forensic mental health professionals provided for forensic evaluations 
was 78.5%, yet the experts estimated their own accuracy in forensic evaluations at 81.85% (p < 
0.001, d = .59 [a medium effect size]).  Furthermore, they rated other forensic mental health 
professionals as more susceptible to cognitive bias in their forensic evaluations (78.1%) than 
themselves (52.2%). 
In the Neal et al. (2017) study of confirmation bias in forensic mental health diagnostic 
judgments described earlier in this chapter, participants were also asked to rate the extent to 
which their own forensic work is influenced by bias (M = 4.74, SD = 1.95) as well as the extent 
to which work by other forensic psychologists is influenced by bias (M = 5.19, SD = 1.86), each 
on a 1 (never) to 9 (always) point Likert-scale.  These questions were designed to measure the 
bias blind spot, the tendency to deny personal bias even while recognizing it in others.  They 
calculated the size of an expert’s bias blind spot by subtracting self-rating from other-rating (M = 
0.51, SD = 1.01). They hypothesized the size of participants’ bias blind spot would be positively 
related to confirmatory bias.  They also hypothesized that cognitive reflection tendencies (the 
ability to resist incorrect heuristic responses in favor of deliberative thought) would be inversely 
related to the size of the bias blind spot. 
The bias blind spot hypothesis yielded a meaningful effect size (i.e., theoretically 
significant) in the predicted direction, but was not statistically significant. Each additional unit of 
discrepancy between self and other ratings of bias (i.e., increasing bias blind spot) more than 
doubled the odds of forensic clinicians engaging in confirmation bias, B = 0.71, Wald(1) = 2.10, 
p = 0.147, Exp(B) = 2.02 (logistic regression model χ2 [1] = 2.33, p = 0.127). The prediction that 
cognitive reflection tendencies would be inversely related to the bias blind spot emerged with a 
small effect size in the predicted direction, but the trend did not reach statistical significance. 
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Forensic clinicians with higher cognitive reflection tendencies had somewhat smaller bias blind 
spots, r = -0.176, p = 0.092. 
 Related literature on social-cognitive biases in similar types of judgment tasks.  
Outside of the forensic mental health contexts, the influence of implicit (System 1) attitudes, 
self-perceptions, and stereotypes on related types of expert judgment tasks are reviewed here.  
These findings are relevant to forensic mental health, because it is likely that many of these same 
implicit social-psychological processes affect the judgments of forensic mental health 
professionals in similar ways.  For example, professional arbitrators’ (Girvan, Deason, and 
Borgida (2015) and law students’ (Braman & Nelson, 2007) legal decisions are systematically 
affected by their attitudes, the bias blind spot has been documented in forensic scientists 
(Kukucka, Kassin, Dror, & Zapf, 2017), and judges and physicians show evidence of implicit 
racial biases in their legal and medical decisions (Green et al., 2007; Rachlinski, Johnson, 
Wistrich, & Guthrie, 2009). 
 Attitudes.  In a study with professional arbitrators who work in the area of labor 
arbitration, Girvan et al. (2015) measured the experts’ explicit and implicit gender attitudes.  In 
the first part of their study, an experimental lab-based study, they did not find evidence that the 
experts gender attitudes affected their decisions in two mock arbitration cases in which the 
gender of the employee-grievants were manipulated (though non-expert undergraduate students 
did show the expected gender biases in their decisions).  However, in a second study, arbitrators’ 
explicit and implicit gender attitudes did predict their decisions in actual published labor 
arbitration cases.  Girvan et al. concluded that implicit and explicit attitudes are important to 
understand as they affect experts’ legal decisions, but that laboratory experiments may not 
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capture the nature of these attitudes’ effects on real decisions – an important insight for 
continued research in this area. 
 The effect of attitudes about civil rights (gay rights in this case) on legally-relevant 
perceptions and judgments by law students was studied by Braman and Nelson (2007).  These 
researchers had participants (both law students and undergraduate students) participate in an 
experiment in which they studied motivated reasoning in legal judgments (see Kunda, 1990).  
Specifically, they asked participants to make legally-relevant decisions about the similarity and 
applicability of previous case law on the target case in the study.  In the law, legal precedent 
(previous case decisions) are used as a guide for deciding future similar cases.  But judges have 
some flexibility in determining what cases are most similar and whether or not a given case is 
analogous enough to a target case to cite as legal precedent.  
The target case used in Braman and Nelson’s (2007) study was the Boy Scouts of the 
United States of American v. Dale (2000) case in which a gay male claimed unlawful 
discrimination by the Boy Scouts after having been removed as a youth leader and dismissed 
from the organization based on his sexual orientation. The researchers varied some aspects of the 
case in an experimental design, including the outcome of source cases, such that some 
participants saw a source case (potential legal precedent) in which unlawful discrimination had 
been found, or a source case in which the defendant had been found to be acting within his 
rights. Participants were asked to rate how similar the source case was to the target case on a 
four-point scale (i.e., how analogous the source case was to cite as legal precedent for deciding 
the target case). They also measured participant’s support on a six-point scale on a question 
about how acceptable it is for a gay man to serve as a Boy Scout.  
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Results revealed that attitudes influenced their legal judgments by affecting the perceived 
similarity between the source cases and the target case.  Participants found the source cases that 
supported their policy views in the target case as more relevant to that litigation.  Braman and 
Nelson (2007) found that legal training did not seem to attenuate motivated perceptions: the law 
students’ attitudes influenced their judgments just as undergraduate students’ attitudes influenced 
their judgments.  
This question about whether legal training attenuates bias is more complicated than this, 
however.  Kahan, Hoffman, Evans, Devins, Lucci, & Cheng (2016) found that legal training did 
protect judges’ and lawyers’ statutory interpretations from their cultural values compared to 
general public participants making the same legal interpretations. They noted that law students’ 
interpretations, however, were somewhat biased by their cultural values.  Girvan (2016) showed 
through an elegant experimental design that not all legal professionals’ judgments are protected 
from bias by virtue of their legal training.  He showed that learning and applying legal rules (i.e., 
removes discretion) does protect legal experts from stereotype-induced bias compared to 
novices, but that learning and applying legal standards (i.e., discretion allowed) does not protect 
legal experts.  
The Self: Bias Blind Spot.  Similar to findings that have emerged in forensic mental 
health, recent findings of the bias blind spot in forensic scientists’ perceptions of themselves has 
also emerged. Kukucka et al. (2017) conducted a recent study of 403 forensic scientists across 
domains (e.g., latent prints, questioned documents, toxicology, biology/serology/DNA, crime 
scene investigation, bitemarks, and firearms/toolmarks) from 21 countries. The mean accuracy 
rating that forensic scientists provided for their field was 94.41%, yet the experts estimated their 
own accuracy at 96.25% (p < 0.001, d = 0.27 [a small effect size]).  Furthermore, consistent with 
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the bias blind spot, they rated other forensic scientists as more susceptible to cognitive bias in 
their work (70.1%) than themselves (25.7%). 
Stereotypes. Although we could not locate any studies of how stereotypes affect forensic 
mental health professionals’ judgments, there are provocative studies of how implicit racial 
biases affect judicial (Rachlinski et al., 2009) and physician (Green et al., 2007) decision making 
that is likely relevant for forensic psychology.  In both of these studies, the researchers used a 
tool called the Implicit Association Test (IAT) focused on race to measure participants’ implicit 
attitudes about race.  The IAT was developed through decades of research on bias and 
stereotypes, and is typically administered via computer through a sorting task in which 
participants pair words and faces.  These researchers found that experts typically do not endorse 
or exhibit explicit (System 2) stereotype-based biases that affect their professional judgments and 
decisions.  But in both studies, implicit (System 1) stereotype-based biases unintentionally 
affected the judges’ and doctors’ judgments and decisions. 
Rachlinski et al. (2009) asked judge participants to complete the computer-based IAT 
first, and then respond to hypothetical vignettes and make decisions about them.  In some 
vignettes, the race of the defendant was subliminally primed but not identified explicitly, 
whereas in the final vignette the race of the defendant was made explicit.  Results from this 
study, first, showed that judges hold implicit racial biases that mirror the general public’s 
implicit attitudes about race (in this IAT’s case, a systematic white over black preference).  
Second, the results showed that judges are not explicitly biased: even when primed with race-
related primes, those primes did not directly affect their judgments. 
However, the implicit racial attitudes of judges did affect their legal judgments 
(Rachlinski et al., 2009).  Judges’ scores on the race IAT had a consistent, marginally significant 
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influence on their judgments across two different vignettes.  Judges with stronger white 
preference on the IAT gave harsher sentences to defendants when they had been primed with 
black-associated words (e.g., graffiti, Harlem, homeboy, jerricurl, rap, segregation, basketball, 
gospel, afro, reggae, athlete) compared to judges who were primed with neutral words (e.g., 
baby, heaven, coffin, summer, truth, accident, mosquito, virus, toothache, rainbow, paralysis).  
And judges who exhibited a black preference on the IAT gave less harsh sentences to defendants 
when they had been primed with black-associated words compared to judges primed with neutral 
words. 
Green and colleagues (2007) studied how implicit racial biases affect physicians’ clinical 
decision making.  They asked physician-participants to respond to a clinical vignette of a patient 
presenting to an emergency room with an acute heart problem and to make a decision about 
whether or not to use thrombolysis, a treatment to dissolve blood clots. Physician participants 
were randomly assigned to either a black or white patient vignette.  They were asked to complete 
the race IAT to measure their implicit racial attitudes as well as respond to questions about 
perceptions of patient cooperativeness, attribution of symptoms to coronary artery disease, and 
respond to a questionnaire about their explicit racial attitudes.  
Results indicated that physicians did not endorse explicitly racial attitudes (Green et al., 
2007).  However, like judges and the general public, physicians exhibited an implicit racial 
preference favoring white people over black people, and they endorsed implicit stereotypes of 
black people as less cooperative with medical procedures and generally.  Furthermore, these 
implicit attitudes affected their clinical decision making.  As the strength of physicians’ implicit 
prowhite bias increased, their likelihood of treating white patients with thrombolysis and not 
treating black patients with thrombolysis increased.  These results demonstration the 
 
 
BIASES IN FORENSIC JUDGMENTS  34 
 
 
disconnection between implicit and explicit attitudes, and the predictive validity of implicit 
attitudes for experts’ judgments.  Results suggest physicians’ implicit racial biases may 
contribute to the minority health disparities present in this country. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have reviewed evidence of unintentional biases in experts’ judgments.  
We have focused especially on forensic mental health experts, but we’ve also described relevant 
findings from other professional arenas in which experts face similar decision tasks.  We started 
with foundational background from cognitive and social psychology, explaining dual-process 
theories of cognition in both subfields of psychology to ground our discussion of bias.  By “bias” 
in this chapter, we focus exclusively on System 1-induced cognitive and social-cognitive biases.  
These are unintentional, understandable, predictable, systematic errors that experts make by 
virtue of being human.  When we understand the contexts and situations in which these types of 
biases emerge, we can work to change these contexts and situations so as to minimize the 
likelihood of biases exerting negative effects on experts’ judgments. In reviewing this literature, 
we have identified several gaps that future research can address.   
Future directions for research.  Most of the empirical evidence of cognitive biases in 
experts’ judgments, as well as the evidence of social-cognitive biases in experts’ judgments, are 
outside of the forensic mental health domain.  We did review the growing and pretty new body 
of evidence regarding cognitive biases in forensic mental health judgments, but a lot of this work 
is not yet published and has not gone through the peer-review system.  Most of the evidence 
about how cognitive biases influence experts’ judgments is in other areas (e.g., forensic science, 
law).  Thus, there is a need for researchers to conduct methodologically strong, ecologically 
valid experimental research in forensic mental health domains to further clarify how and when 
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cognitive biases affect forensic mental health experts’ judgments and decisions.  When we better 
understand how cognitive biases work in this domain, we can better design mitigation 
procedures.  
Similarly, very little of the evidence on implicit social-cognitive biases is in the domain 
of forensic mental health.  In fact, only emerging information about the “bias blind spot” is in the 
forensic mental health domain.  We did review some studies of how forensic mental health 
professionals’ attitudes influence their judgments; however, these attitudes have only been 
measured explicitly to date and it is not clear whether implicit attitudes also affect forensic 
mental health judgments.  It is highly likely, given findings from law (e.g., Girvan et al., 2015), 
but as of yet remains unstudied in forensic mental health.   
We were unable to find a single study of how implicit stereotypes affect the judgments 
and decisions of forensic mental health experts.  There is compelling evidence from law 
(Rachlinski et al., 2009) and medicine (Green et al., 2007) that implicit racial stereotypes will 
likely influence forensic mental health professionals’ judgments too, but as of yet there appear to 
be no studies of this issue.  Furthermore, there is a need for studying how other kinds of implicit 
stereotypes (not just race) affect professionals’ decisions – both in forensic mental health as well 
as in other domains.  This area is ripe for future research. 
In sum, there is strong theoretical reasons to suspect that forensic mental health 
professionals are subject to the effects of unintentional System 1-induced cognitive and social-
cognitive biases in their judgments and decisions.  Emerging research from the forensic mental 
health domain supports these theoretical predictions, but much work remains to be done to better 
understand the boundary conditions of when and how these particular kinds of experts are biased 
in the particular environmental contexts in which they work.  As more research in this area 
 
 
BIASES IN FORENSIC JUDGMENTS  36 
 
 
emerges, it will flesh out the unique ways in which the contextual environments of forensic 
mental health affect our judgments.  It will also inform what can be done to mitigate the effects 
of these unintentional and unwanted biases in forensic mental health professionals’ judgments 
and decisions. 
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